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ABSTRACT
Ionospheric anomalies, like ionospheric gradients, might produce a difference between the ionospheric error experienced by the
Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) reference station and the aircraft on approach. This ionospheric delay difference
could lead to position errors if undetected.
For that reason, the GBAS Approach Service Types (GAST) C and D provide solutions against this threat, but the methods
employed still face challenges. In the case of GAST C, the GBAS integrity parameters are inflated in order to exclude potentially
usable satellite geometries that could produce unacceptably large position errors if affected by a worst case gradient. The GAST D
concept contains a significant amount of monitors to cover different regions of the ionospheric threat space, which includes a
combination of gradient sizes, directions and speeds. Both methodologies have a negative impact on the availability of the system,
especially when trying to implement GAST C and D in regions with severe ionospheric behavior, i.e. equatorial regions, because
of the exclusion of too many satellite geometries in the case of GAST C and a high rate of false alarms in GAST D.
This paper proposes a real-time ionospheric monitoring approach that supports the already existing GAST C and D solutions
without changing the overall integrity concept. The proposed concept is based on a multi-frequency multi-constellation receiver
network external to the GBAS installation that provides real-time ionospheric information to the GBAS stations. A GAST C
reference station could use this information to reduce the maximum gradient to consider in the inflation of the integrity parameters
while a GAST D station could benefit from prior probabilities of appearance relaxing the monitoring thresholds and thus provoking
less false alarms.
The monitoring approach is first explained and then evaluated with simulated data. This data is constructed based on real
measurements of noise and multipath taken with both Choke-ring and Multipath Limiting Antennas (MLAs), and models for the
nominal ionospheric decorrelation.
Simulation results show that a considerable reduction of the threat space that the remaining monitors in GAST C and D have to
consider seems feasible. Furthermore, the main effects of the presence of high levels of noise and multipath in the measurements
used are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is a local-area augmentation of the Global Navigation Satellite Systems
(GNSSs). Its main purpose is to ‘augment’ or enhance the GNSS performances in terms of integrity, continuity, accuracy and
availability. A GBAS reference station broadcasts differential corrections along with integrity parameters. The differential
corrections enable the aircraft approaching the airport to correct the navigation signals from the satellites and thus improve the
accuracy of its position. The integrity parameters enable the airborne system to calculate bounds of the residual position errors and
ensure the safety of the operation.
The currently commercially available GBAS Approach Service Type (GAST) C ground stations support operations down to CAT I
minima [1]. Standards for GAST D intended to support CAT II/III operations are completed and stations could be operational by
2020. Both GAST C and GAST D systems are based on a single-frequency (L1) single-constellation (GPS) architecture.
Single-frequency single-constellation differential corrections provided by the GBAS ground station enable the airborne system to
correct most of the GPS ranging errors, especially the ones caused by the experienced ionospheric delay. Nevertheless, nominal
residual errors still remain and are overbounded by the so-called protection levels (PLs). The protection levels are calculated by
the avionics using error models and the integrity parameters received from the ground station. Then, they are compared to the
alert limits (ALs), the maximum allowable bounds, to determine safety of the operation for each user. If the PLs exceed the ALs,
GBAS is unavailable. The component of the PLs that describes and overbounds the remaining residual errors due to the nominal
ionospheric decorrelation between the reference station and the user is called the σvig, [2], [3]. σvig is an integrity parameter
broadcast by the ground station that ensures the safety of the operation only as long as the state of the ionosphere is nominal.
Thus, it does not protect users against abnormal ionospheric activity, like large ionospheric gradients acting between the ground
station and the airplane on approach. In this case, there is a significant difference between the ionospheric error experienced by the
GBAS reference station and the aircraft. This may lead to not differentially-corrected and improperly bounded position errors if
undetected.
Protection of airborne users against this kind of threat has already been tackled in GAST C and D. A GAST C ground station
verifies by simulation that each satellite geometry potentially usable at the aircraft (PLs < ALs) is safe in the presence of the
ionosphere-anomaly threat applicable in the region in a process called geometry screening [4]. In case a simulated satellite
geometry is not safe, the ground station inflates the integrity parameters so that the PLs exceed the ALs when an arriving aircraft
aims to use this satellite geometry, making GBAS unavailable. The main problem is that in GAST C, this algorithm is performed
by applying a threat model based on the worst-ever-experienced ionospheric gradient in the relevant region, e.g. 140 mm/km in
the case of Germany [3] or 425 mm/km in the CONUS region [5]. This methodology is very conservative because it assumes
that the worst-case ionospheric gradient is always present in the ionosphere, while this is very unlikely. This means that satellite
geometries are excluded even in days with nominal ionosphere (without a gradient) leading to a loss of availability. Moreover, this
procedure cannot protect users against a larger gradient that might occur at some point in time in the future.
The GAST D concept follows a different approach when protecting against harmful ionospheric gradients. The ground manufacturer
has to ensure that the maximum differential range error due to an ionospheric gradient at every Landing Threshold Point (LTP)
supporting GAST D operations is not greater than 2.75 meters [6]. For that purpose, GAST D does not assume always the presence
of a worst-case gradient as done in GAST C, but contains a significant amount of sensitive monitors on the ground as well as in the
airborne system [7].
Combining all the monitors together, the GAST D GBAS should prevent the ionospheric differential range error to exceed the
mentioned limit by detecting all the possible ionospheric gradients inside the threat space with a probability of missed detection
(Pmd) of 10−9. The threat space is the combination of all possible gradient sizes, velocities and directions that can occur in a certain
region up to a maximum, which depends again on the worst gradient ever seen. The monitoring thresholds were evaluated utilizing
the mid-latitude ionospheric threat model, which goes up to 500 mm/km [8]. While trying to adapt the GAST D concept to other
regions, the monitors could suffer from a high rate of false alarms (as in equatorial regions) impacting the GBAS availability or
even be unnecessary (as the Ionospheric Gradient Monitor in Germany).
In short, the methods employed in GAST C and D are able to ensure the required level of safety, but can result in undesirable
unavailability of the system, especially in equatorial regions with highly active ionospheric conditions. Here, the ionospheric
conditions are completely different from those of the mid-latitudes, where the ionosphere is nominally ‘calm’ and rarely presents
large ionospheric gradients harmful for GBAS.
Many studies have been carried out in this direction, evaluating the possibility of implementing GBAS in equatorial regions
without losing significantly its availability. In [9] and [10] the assessment of the Brazilian GBAS ionospheric spatial gradient
was carried out including gradients up to 850.7 mm/km produced by Equatorial Plasma Bubbles (EPBs), which are ionospheric
anomalies, smaller in size but often steeper than the ionospheric gradients observed in the CONUS region. In [11], the authors
develop the concept of the GAST C geometry screening for Brazil including as well the EPBs. They calculate the availability of
Figure 1: Simplified scheme of the network.
GBAS to be 99.3% during the daytime and 58.3% in the nighttime when using the Brazilian threat model. Their results show
the difficulty to meet CAT I availability requirements while using the geometry screening and propose a Morte Carlo method
that improves the availability results but is still insufficient. Furthermore, these methods can still not protect against future larger
gradients because they rely on the ionospheric threat model, which is based on historical data.
In the case of GAST D, the service provider may consider that the ionospheric behaviour in the region he is in charge of is not
adequately characterized by the threat model. In this situation, he is allowed to introduce additional internal or external monitoring
to the GBAS (section 7.5.6.1.7. ‘Ionospheric Anomaly Threat Models Used for GAST D validation’ of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards And Recommended Practices (SARPs) [6]).
In this work, we propose a real-time ionospheric monitoring approach that supports the already existing GAST C and D solutions
by reducing their conservatism without changing the overall integrity concept. The result of our monitoring defines the maximum
gradient to be used in the GBAS with a resultant reduction of the threat space in both GAST C and D.
II. METHODS
A. Dual frequency monitoring concept
As mentioned previously, the availability of GBAS is determined mainly through the achieved protection levels and the rate of false
alarms. The first ones are increased especially in GAST C while assuming a worst-case gradient that is rarely present. The second
is problematic in GAST D while applying the same monitoring thresholds to regions in which the ionosphere is not represented
with the mid-latitudes ionospheric threat model [8].
For that reason, the goal of this work is to introduce some flexibility in the current GAST C and D approaches and thus increase
their availability by introducing external information in GBAS. This external information would come from a widespread network
of receivers located outside the GBAS installation. In Figure 1, we show a simplified scheme of the proposed network with only
six receivers and one satellite, but the concept can be expanded for n receivers and m satellites from different constellations.
The functionality of the network is described in the following:
1. The network monitors the ionosphere in real-time. For each epoch, ionospheric delays are estimated at each Ionospheric
Pierce Point (IPP). The Ionospheric Pierce Points (IPPs) are the intersections of the line of sight satellite-receiver with the
ionosphere, modelled as a thin shell located at 350 km from the Earth’s surface [12].
2. Ionospheric gradients between all the ionospheric delay estimations are calculated. Here, all the possible connections between
receivers are taken into account, i.e. Rxi and Rx j where i ∈ [1,6] and j ∈ [1,6] in the example of Figure 1. If both IPPs are
unaffected by the gradient, we measure the nominal spatial decorrelation of the ionosphere.
3. The estimated ionospheric gradients are shared in the network.
4. Each GBAS station is then responsible of using the network information to support the already existing equipment in covering
the GBAS approaches of each airport. The minimum detectable gradient is calculated for every GBAS station taking into
account the multipath and noise conditions, the location of the GBAS station and the network information for this location.
Finally, the integrity parameters are adjusted according to the detector performance. Therefore, the overall integrity concept
would remain unchanged.
Let us remark that this monitoring approach would not replace the inflation in GAST C or the monitors in GAST D, but would
reduce the threat space that the current techniques have to cover. The introduction of this concept implies: i) in GAST C, the
substitution of the always considered worst-case gradient used in the geometry screening with the minimum detectable gradient
achieved with the proposed network and ii) in GAST D, the relaxation of the current monitoring thresholds plus added detectability
of ionospheric gradients not covered by the mid-latitudes ionospheric threat space. As an outcome, we expect less stringent
monitoring requirements to be necessary with the consequent increase in the availability of current GAST C and D.
B. Description of the estimation approach
Our network consists of a set of multi-frequency multi-constellation receivers distributed over a region, that will detect the
gradients and provide integrity to the single-frequency single-constellation users in real time. The multi-frequency capability is
used to estimate the ionospheric delays, whereas the multi-constellation may bring a benefit while detecting the gradients for the
single-constellation users as we dispose of more measurements of the ionospheric delay. In this paper, we use two constellations:
GPS and Galileo.
In the following, we describe how the network works in real time. For each epoch:
1. All the receivers acquire the pseudorange measurements from the dual-frequency satellites, which are then smoothed with a
Hatch Filter. The smoothed pseudorange measurements are expressed in Equation 1 [13]:
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where r j is the geometric range from user to the satellite j, c is the speed of light, δt is the receiver clock bias, δ jt is the
satellite clock bias, T̂ j is the smoothed tropospheric delay, Î ji is the smoothed ionospheric delay for frequency i and M̂P
j
i and
ξ̂ jρ,i are the code multipath and thermal noise on frequency i. The frequency i is L1/E1 (1575.42 MHz) and L5/E5a (1176.45
MHz) for both GPS and Galileo.
In the next paragraphs, we consider the superscripts as satellites and the subscripts as frequencies.
2. The algorithm computes the dual frequency ionospheric slant delay (Equation 2) [13]:
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where f2 is L5 for the GPS and E5a for Galileo and f1 is L1 for the GPS and E1 for Galileo.
If we substitute in Equation 2, the expression of the smoothed pseudoranges from Equation 1, we obtain:
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f2, f1 are the differences of the ionospheric delay, code multipath and code thermal noise
between the smoothed pseudoranges in f1 and f2. Moreover, an additional term η̂ jf2, f1 appears here, which represents the
interfrequency biases introduced on the code by the receivers and the satellites.
The problem of using the slant delay for estimating an ionospheric gradient is that not all the satellites are comparable
because of the path that the pseudoranges have to follow through the ionosphere, which is longer when the satellites are in
low elevations (the minimum is just in the zenit). Because of the elevation dependency, only the satellites with parallel line of
sights would be comparable, and this fact reduces the number of IPPs available to detect ionospheric gradients.
3. For that reason, the slant delay (Î jf1,slant) is translated into vertical delay by applying the obliquity factor (OF) expressed in
Equation 4 [13] like in Equation 5.
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Here, RE is the radius of the Earth, hI is the height of the thin shell layer commonly set at 350 km above the Earth’s surface
and θ j is the elevation of satellite j in degrees.
Î jf1,vert =
Î jf1,slant
OF j
(5)
This way, all the measurements are comparable, but other issues may arise: the OF is only valid as long as the ionosphere is
nominal. This means that we could commit an error in case of using it in the situation of having a gradient as well. In this
work, we neglect this issue as we consider the calculation of this error and introduction of its value in our algorithm as part of
the future work.
4. Once we have in each epoch all the vertical ionospheric delays, we compute the gradients between all the possible IPPs by
applying the following formula:
Vertical ionospheric gradient j,k =
Î jf1,vert − Îkf1,vert
d j,k
(6)
where the Vertical ionospheric gradient is commonly expressed in mm/km, Î jf1,vert and Î
k
f1,vert
are the ionospheric vertical
delays in milimeters in L1/E1 and d j,k is the distance between the IPPs. Let us remark that the gradient slopes in this case are
calculated in the vertical domain and not in slant as in the threat model [5].
As seen in Equation 3 and mentioned previously, in a real case, the estimation of the slant ionospheric delay does not contain
only information about ionosphere, but combined multipath, thermal noise and interfrequency biases from two pseudoranges as
well. These measurements depend strongly on the antenna and receiver characteristics as well as their location on ground. As a
consequence, it may happen that the value of the ionospheric delay is estimated incorrectly due to the level of noise and multipath
present in the measurements. These errors affect particularly when using them to estimate a gradient (Equation 6) as they gain
importance when the IPPs of the measurements are very close together and thus we divide by a small distance. Putting a hard limit
on the IPP distances that we use for our calculations could be a solution, but as we are especially looking for close by distances to
better detect the gradients, it is necessary to characterize the local noise and multipath affecting the measurements and determine
their effect in the value of the ionospheric delay. Besides, even without any harmful irregularities present in the ionosphere, we
can always find the nominal ionospheric decorrelation in our estimation of the gradient.
For that reason, in this work we study the ionospheric gradients that could be detected utilizing a network with the characteristics
described in Section A. In other words, we compute the minimum gradient that could be detected with different characteristics of
noise and multipath. The tuning of the integrity parameters or the evaluation of the concept with actual gradients will be part of
the future work. Moreover, further studies will have to be done to account for the interfrequency biases mentioned in Equation 3.
C. Simulation
At this point, step 4 of Section A., we need to compute the minimum detectable gradient for the current epoch by using the
Vertical ionospheric gradients computed with Equation 6.
This value is derived considering the uncertainty of our approach, σmonitoring, which includes both the uncertainty of the noise and
multipath of the measurements as well as the uncertainty of the nominal vertical ionospheric delay.
In this work, we calculate the minimum detectable gradient with simulated data based on real measurements. We construct the
σmonitoring by introducing known levels of noise and multipath acquired from real measurements to the nominal vertical ionospheric
delay.
The real levels of code noise and multipath are simulated considering two different types of antennas: Choke-ring and Multipath
Limiting antennas (MLAs). The first ones lead to more noise and multipath, but are much cheaper than the seconds ones, which
we use as a reference for good quality measurements. For representing the nominal ionospheric conditions, we take samples from
the Klobuchar model [12] and the σvig value calculated for Germany [3].
Once we have both the uncertainties of noise and multipath and the ionospheric nominal decorrelation, we need to combine them
to compute the minimum detectable gradient that our network can achieve. This process is described in the following.
Noise and multipath
In the GBAS context, the local system characteristics, multipath and noise, are represented in the so-called σgnd values. These
values for σgnd are derived from at least 24 hours of measurements from the ground station and are based on a 100-second
smoothing time constant. In this work, we use measurements from two different types of antennas: Leica AR-25 Choke ring
antennas situated in DLR’s GBAS test bed in Braunschweig (northern Germany) and MLAs [14].
As we want to study the effects of the combined multipath and noise from two frequencies, we need to compute the combination
of two σgnd values, one from f1 and the other one from f2 as represented in Equation 7 [15]:
σgnd f1 , f2 =
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where f1 is the GPS L1 frequency 1575.42 MHz, f2 is the GPS L5 frequency 1176.45 MHz, σgnd, f1 are the σgnd values for the
frequency L1 and σgnd, f2 are the σgnd values for the frequency L5. All σgnd values were computed by sorting data into elevation
bins with bin sizes of 1◦ up to a satellite elevation of 30◦, 2◦ between 30◦ and 50◦, and 5◦ for all higher elevations.
Let us remark that we have taken into account σgnd values computed only with GPS satellites, as we consider Galileo with equal
or better performance in terms of multipath and noise [16].
As we have two satellites involved in the calculation of the vertical ionospheric gradient, in this value the combination of the
multipath and noise from both satellites is present. We calculate the standard deviation of the combined noise and multipath from
both satellites, σmultipath noise comb, in Equation 8.
σmultipath noise comb
(
θ j,θ k
)
=
√
σ2gnd f1 , f2
(θ j)+σ2gnd f1, f2
(θ k) (8)
where θ j is the elevation of one of the satellites and θ k is the elevation of the other satellite involved in the calculation of the
vertical ionospheric gradient. The only variables present in this calculation are the elevations of both satellites due to the fact that
the noise and multipath of the measurements are not dependent on the separation between their IPPs, but they are on the elevation
of the satellites.
Nominal spatial decorrelation of the ionosphere
As previously stated, the ionosphere changes nominally with space and time. This phenomenom is called ionosphere spatial and
temporal decorrelation. The spatial decorrelation produces an expected difference in the value of the vertical delay because the
ionosphere is being sampled in two or more IPPs that are separated. In other words, the larger it is the distance between two
IPPs more likely it is that the value of the ionospheric vertical delay is different in each of them, and the closer together, the less
difference there is in these values.
This means that, besides the noise and multipath, we need to consider as well the ionospheric decorrelation in our calculations in
order to have a better estimation of the detection capability.
As mentioned in Section I., the σvig value describes the nominal spatial decorrelation of the ionosphere per country/region. However,
a GBAS ground station cannot distinguish typical ‘quiet’ ionospheric conditions from ‘active’ (but not stormy) conditions in real
time [2]. For that reason, data from ‘active’ but not harmful ionospheric conditions was taken into account in the σvig calculation.
Therefore, it makes sense to use it as a conservative overbound of the nominal state of the ionosphere in our simulations. We use
as well the Klobuchar model [12] to determine a less conservative nominal decorrelation of the ionosphere.
Klobuchar model
The goal of the Klobuchar model [12] is to be able to correct at least the 50 percent of the ionospheric time-delay in single-frequency
single-constellation global positioning systems. It includes the main features of the complex behavior of the ionosphere in an
algorithm that requires a minimum of coefficients and user computational time.
The Klobuchar model provides the ionospheric time-delay correction for GPS given geodetic latitude, geodetic longitude, elevation
angle and azimuth angle to the particular GPS satellite and αn and βn coefficients, which are transmitted as part of the satellite
message [12]. The ionospheric vertical time-delay can then be translated into spatial delay by multiplying by the speed of light.
Once the vertical ionospheric delay is estimated in each IPP with the Klobuchar model, Equation 6 can be applied to calculate all
the vertical ionospheric gradients between the IPPs. However, in order to obtain a representative value for the nominal decorrelation
using the Klobuchar model, we build a Gaussian distribution by using all the vertical ionospheric gradients previously calculated
during one day. Below, we explain the process to compute the Klobuchar distribution used in this paper.
For every 300 seconds in a day, we compute the IPPs corresponding to GPS and Galileo satellites by using information from their
nominal almanacs and 30 receivers uniformly randomly distributed over Germany. The date of the data used is: 16-08-2016. Then,
we calculate the ionospheric vertical delay for that IPPs using the Klobuchar model [12]. After that, we compute the vertical
ionospheric gradients in milimeters per kilometer between IPPs and store them as well as the distance between the corresponding
IPPs. All the data is sorted into distance bins and mean and σ values are computed inside each bin. Each of the σ values per
distance bin is overbounded. The result is our σklobuchar, which depends only in the distance between the IPPs.
Figure 2: Minimum Detectable Gradient.
Minimum Detectable Gradient calculation
Considering both the noise and multipath component, σmultipath noise comb computed with Equation 8, and the ionospheric vertical
decorrelation component, σdecorr that is either σvig or σklobuchar, we can calculate our σmonitoring as in Equation 9.
σmonitoring
(
θ j,θ k,d j,k
)
=
√
σ2decorr (d j,k)+σ
2
multipath noise comb (θ j,θ k) (9)
Here, θ j is the elevation of satellite j, θ k is the elevation of satellite k and d j,k is the distance between the IPPs corresponding to
satellites j and k.
A sample from the nominal distribution is represented in Figure 2 as Gaussian with zero mean and a standard deviation of
σmonitoring as we include the nominal ionospheric decorrelation as part of its uncertainty. Given acceptable false alarm and missed
detection probabilities, Pf a and Pmd , a minimum detectable gradient (MDG) can then be defined as:
MDG=
(
k f a+ kmd
) ·σmonitoring(θ j,θ k,d j,k) (10)
where k f a is the false alarm multiplier computed from the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution (Equation 11)
and kmd is the missed detection multiplier (Equation 12).
k f a = Q−1
(
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2
)
(11)
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(
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2
)
(12)
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Noise and multipath
Figure 3 shows that the largest combined noise and multipath, σmultipath noise comb, for the Choke-ring antenna coincides with
the situation of having both satellites at 5◦ elevation. The σmultipath noise comb in this case is equal to 0.75 meters due to the fact
that the noise and multipath get larger when the satellites are in low elevations. On the other hand, noise and multipath have
less importance when the satellites are located on high elevations, e.g. when θ j and θ k are both 85◦, which results in a value of
σmultipath noise comb of 0.25 meters.
In the case of using a MLA (Figure 4), the combined noise and multipath values are all below 0.1 meters, making an important
difference with the case of the Choke-ring antenna.
Moreover, we can observe a difference in the shape of both Figures 3 and 4. This difference is due to the noise and multipath
limitation capability of the MLA, which decreases the dependence of these values on the elevation. This way, the noise and
multipath values represented in Figure 4 are very similar to each other regardless of the elevation of the satellites.
Figure 3: σmultipath noise comb for the Choke-ring antenna. Figure 4: σmultipath noise comb for the MLA.
B. Nominal spatial decorrelation of the ionosphere
In this subsection, we compare the nominal ionospheric decorrelation explained in Section C., Germany’s σvig and σklobuchar,
with the level of noise and multipath presented in the previous subsection. In this case, we eliminate the elevation dependence by
calculating the σmultipath noise comb of the actual satellites, GPS and Galileo, in their elevations during one day and then sorting the
calculated values into IPP distance bins.
Figure 5: Comparison between σmultipath noise comb
(Choke-ring and MLA) and the nominal ionospheric
decorrelation (σklobuchar and σvig).
Figure 6: Zoom of the comparison between
σmultipath noise comb (Choke-ring and MLA) and the nominal
ionospheric decorrelation (σklobuchar and σvig).
Figures 5 and 6 show that until an IPP separation distance of 270 km, the nominal decorrelation of the ionosphere calculated
with the Klobuchar model does not exceed the noise and multipath that a Choke-ring antenna would measure. This means that
for distances below this value, we could detect a gradient when there are only noise and multipath. In the case of the MLA, the
nominal ionosphere exceeds the noise and multipath at a much shorter IPP separation distance, 37.5 km. This is already a small
distance between IPPs considering the study of the σvig computation in which the authors pointed out the lack of data for IPP
separation distances below 50 km [2]. Our approach would increase the information about the ionosphere considerably, as we
could use close-by IPPs to compute the gradients. In the case of the conservative bound for the nominal decorrelation, σvig, the
value decreases to 10 km.
However, in this subsection we are not taking into account yet the GBAS integrity requirements. In the next subsection, we include
the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection, Pf a and Pmd , mentioned in Section II. C. in order to introduce sufficient
integrity into the concept and therefore meet the GBAS requirements.
C. Minimum Detectable Gradient calculation
Considering the σmultipath noise comb and the σdecorr, σvig and σklobuchar, represented in Figures 5 and 6, we calculate σmonitoring
expressed in Equation 9. Therefore, the minimum detectable gradient (Figures 7, 8 and Equation 10) is computed by fixing both
the Pmd to 10−9 and Pf a to 10−7.
Figure 7: Minimum detectable gradient for all the
combinations of antennas (Choke-ring and MLA) and nominal
ionospheric decorrelations (σklobuchar and σvig).
Figure 8: Zoom of the minimum detectable gradient for all
the combinations of antennas (Choke-ring and MLA) and
nominal ionospheric decorrelations (σklobuchar and σvig).
Results show the minimum slope of the ionospheric gradient that our network would be able to detect taking into account different
conditions of noise, multipath and nominal decorrelation. This result only applies if the direction of movement of the gradient is
parallel to the line connecting the IPPs used for the gradient estimation. In case the direction is different, we could only estimate
the projection of the actual gradient into the parallel line already mentioned.
Regarding this information, a considerable reduction of the threat space that has to be considered while performing ionospheric
monitoring in GBAS seems feasible.
In the most conservative scenario, using Choke-ring antennas and σvig (dashed-violet line in Figures 7 and 8), we can detect
gradients above 45 mm/km with IPP separation distances over 38 km. This result implies three main facts: i) we can not distinguish
between an actual gradient and high amounts of noise and multipath when using IPP separation distances below 38 km in this
worst-case scenario, ii) we could miss an actual gradient which is below 45 mm/km and iii) we could underestimate the value of
an ionospheric gradient when it is very narrow and steep because the sampling of the ionosphere is still not enough compared to
the gradient size.
Nevertheless, we are able to lower considerably the value currently used in the German threat model, 140 mm/km, by approximately
3 times for baselines over 38 km and directions of the gradient parallel to the IPPs location.
In a more realistic scenario, Choke-ring antennas and the Klobuchar model (red line in Figures 7 and 8) we can detect gradients
over 45 mm/km for IPP separation distances over 30 km. Here, we are able to use data coming from IPPs separated 30 km for the
same gradient value. There is a difference with the previous result as we are considering a less conservative nominal ionosphere,
but we are still not able to use the most close-by IPPs due to the high level of noise and multipath present in the Choke-ring antenna
measurements. However, we would still be able to reduce considerably the threat space currently considered in GAST C and D.
When using a better quality antenna, MLA, and the Klobuchar model (blue line in Figures 7 and 8), we can detect gradients over
38 mm/km using all the data available. The main advantage of this result is that we can use the data obtained from short baselines,
i.e. IPPs separated below 10 km. This means that we can measure the value of steep gradients with higher accuracy than in the
more conservative scenarios without adding more receivers to the network. Additionally, we lower the value considered for the
German threat model approximately 4 times. However, using MLAs would increase enormously the value of the network and may
not be necessary if in a particular region we do not need such an accuracy.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this work we have proposed a real-time ionospheric monitoring approach for single-frequency (L1) single-constellation (GPS)
GBAS users, based on a wide area network of multi-frequency multi-constellation GNSS receivers.
First, we explained the functionality of the network. Here, we identified the problem of using measurements containing high levels
of noise and multipath and a nominal ionospheric decorrelation for the detection of the gradients with the proposed network.
Then, we evaluated the proposed concept with simulated data. We used realistic values for the noise and multipath from real
measurements of a Choke-ring and Multipath Limiting antennas and the nominal ionospheric decorrelation from the Klobuchar
model and the σvig value for Germany. Utilizing this simulated data, we computed the minimum detectable gradient that can be
estimated with our network.
Simulation results show that a considerable reduction of the threat space that the remaining monitors, geometry screening in GAST
C and integrity monitoring in GAST D, have to considered seems feasible even while utilizing cheaper antennas for the detection.
Furthermore, the main benefit of this approach is that it supports the already existing GAST C and D solutions by reducing their
conservatism without changing the overall integrity concept.
Future work will validate the estimation capability of our concept with data from real gradients and integrate the minimum
detectable gradient into the computation of the current GAST C and D integrity parameters.
References
[1] RTCA DO-253C. Minimum Operational Performance Standards for GPS Local Area Augmentation System Airborne
Equipment. Tech. rep. 253C. Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, 2008.
[2] Jiyun Lee et al. “Assessment of Ionosphere Spatial Decorrelation for Global Positioning System-Based Aircraft Landing
Systems”. In: Journal of Aircraft 44.5 (2007), pp. 1662–1669. DOI: 10.2514/1.28199.
[3] Christoph Mayer et al. “Ionosphere Threat Space Model Assessment for GBAS”. In: ION GNSS 2009. 2009. URL:
http://elib.dlr.de/60300/.
[4] Jiyun Lee et al. “Position-Domain Geometry Screening to Maximize LAAS Availability in the Presence of Ionosphere
Anomalies”. In: Proceedings of the ION GNSS. 2006.
[5] Seebany Datta-Barua et al. “Ionospheric Threat Parameterization for Local Area Global-Positioning-System-Based Aircraft
Landing Systems”. In: Journal of Aircraft 47.4 (2010), pp. 1141–1151.
[6] ICAO. Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) Annex 10. Tech. rep. ICAO, 2017.
[7] RTCA DO-253D. “Minimum Operational Performance Standards for GPS Local Area Augmentation System Airborne
Equipment”. In: Tech. rep. 253D. Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (2017).
[8] ICAO NSP/3. Proposed amendments to Annex 10: Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS) provisions. -WP-3. Montreal,
Canada, 2016.
[9] Jiyun Lee et al. “Preliminary Results from Ionospheric Threat Model Development to Support GBAS Operations in the
Brazilian Region”. In: Proceedings of the 28th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of the Institute of
Navigation (ION GNSS+15). 2015.
[10] Moonseok Yoon, Dongwoo Kim, and Jiyun Lee. “Validation of Ionospheric Spatial Decorrelation Observed During
Equatorial Plasma Bubble Events”. In: IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and Remote Sensing 55.1 (2017), pp. 261–271.
[11] Moonseok Yoon et al. “Assessment of Equatorial Plasma Bubble Impacts on Ground-Based Augmentation Systems in
the Brazilian Region”. In: Proceedings of the 2016 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation (2016),
pp. 368–379.
[12] John A Klobuchar. “Ionospheric time-delay algorithm for single-frequency GPS users”. In: IEEE Transactions on aerospace
and electronic systems 3 (1987), pp. 325–331.
[13] Pratap Misra and Per Enge. “Global Positioning System: Signals, Measurements and Performance Second Edition”. In:
Massachusetts: Ganga-Jamuna Press (2006).
[14] Daniel Gerbeth et al. “Nominal Performance of Future Dual Frequency Dual Constellation GBAS”. In: International
Journal of Aerospace Engineering 2016 (2016), pp. 1–20. ISSN: 1687-5974. DOI: 10.1155/2016/6835282. URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/6835282.
[15] Mihaela-Simona Circiu et al. “Assessment of Different Dual-frequency Dual-constellation GBAS Processing Modes based
on Flight Trials”. In: Proceedings of ION GNSS+ 2016 (2016).
[16] Mihaela-Simona Circiu et al. “Evaluation of GPS L5 and Galileo E1 and E5a Performance for Future Multifrequency and
Multiconstellation GBAS”. In: Navigation 64.1 (2017), pp. 149–163.
